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reduce warm glow for children who
can be helped
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1 Department of Psychology, Linköping University, Linköping, Sweden, 2 Decision Research, Eugene, OR, USA, 3 Department
of Psychology, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR, USA
In a great many situations where we are asked to aid persons whose lives are
endangered, we are not able to help everyone. What are the emotional and motivational
consequences of “not helping all”? In a series of experiments, we demonstrate that
negative affect arising from children that could not be helped decreases the warm
glow of positive feeling associated with aiding the children who can be helped. This
demotivation from the children outside of our reach may be a form of “pseudoinefficacy”
that is non-rational. We should not be deterred from helping whomever we can because
there are others we are not able to help.
Keywords: pseudoinefficacy, affect integration, singularity effect, prosocial behavior, psychic numbing,
compassion
“Beliefs of personal eﬃcacy constitute the key factor of human agency. If people believe they
have no power to produce results, they will not attempt to make things happen (Bandura,
1997, p. 3)”.
Introduction
What motivates us to help others whose lives are endangered? More speciﬁcally, what motivates us
to help in certain situations, while in others, we turn away? The answer to this question depends
on the extent to which we value potential or actual losses of lives. Normatively, the scope or magni-
tude of a disaster or crisis should be the main carrier of value and motivation to act (Dickert et al.,
2012). But, descriptively, our actions are sometimes insensitive to, or even demotivated by, increas-
ing numbers of people at risk (Slovic, 2007). For example, a single identiﬁed victim often evokes
stronger feelings and greater willingness to help than an unidentiﬁed single victim or a group
of victims, identiﬁed or not. The preference for helping a single identiﬁed victim over a group
of victims is known as the singularity eﬀect (Kogut and Ritov, 2005b). In other circumstances,
decision makers appear to be constructing their life-saving preferences on the basis of contextual
information that may not be normatively justiﬁable. In a study by Jenni and Loewenstein (1997),
participants evaluated a program saving two lives annually more favorably when those two lives
were half of a population of four at risk, than when they were a much smaller percentage of 1,700
at risk. Slovic et al. (2002) termed this type of eﬀect proportion dominance (see also Bartels, 2006),
and argued that aﬀective feelings play a central role in this phenomenon.
In the present article, we examine another contextual factor that may not be normatively justi-
ﬁed: information about lives we cannot save may induce negative aﬀect and demotivate us from
saving those we can through dampening of good feelings.
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Pseudoinefficacy
Decisions are strongly motivated by perceived eﬃcacy (Cryder
et al., 2013; Erlandsson et al., 2013). Ineﬃcacy, real or perceived,
shrivels response, even among those who have the desire and the
means to protect and improve lives. We propose that ineﬀective-
ness is linked to negative aﬀect and avoidance behaviors (Västfjäll
and Slovic, 2013). It is especially troubling that eﬃcacy some-
times goes unrecognized and vital aid that could be provided is
withheld due to an illusion of ineﬀectiveness that we have named
pseudoineﬃcacy.
In reviewing what appeared to be unrelated ﬁndings from
two earlier studies of life-saving decisions, we uncovered a curi-
ous connection that motivated the present research. These prior
studies asked people to provide clean water to aid people facing
death from disease (Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997) or to provide
money to protect a child from starvation (Small et al., 2007).
Fetherstonhaugh et al. (1997) found that people were less likely
to send clean water that could save 4,500 lives in a refugee camp
when the number of people in the camp was large (250,000) than
when it was small (11,000). Small et al. (2007) found that the
money donated to a 7-year-old African child facing starvation
decreased dramatically when the donor was made aware that the
child was one of millions needing food aid.
The ﬁndings from these two studies may have broad impli-
cations for prosocial or humanitarian behavior in light of the
insights of Andreoni (1990), who contended that we help others
not only because they need our help but because we antici-
pate and experience the warm glow of good feeling associated
with giving aid. Subsequent empirical studies have supported this
contention (e.g., Dunn et al., 2008). We hypothesize that knowl-
edge of those “out of reach” (more in the large refugee camp and
millions of starving people in Africa) may have triggered nega-
tive feelings that countered the good feelings anticipated from
giving aid, thus demotivating action. A related explanation is
that, compared to the large numbers of persons out of reach,
the prospective aid created a sense of ineﬃcacy, that is, a “drop-
in-the-bucket” eﬀect (Bartels and Burnett, 2011). Although the
results from these studies by Fetherstonhaugh et al. (1997) and
Small et al. (2007) may appear at ﬁrst glance to reﬂect ineﬃcacy,
this is not really ineﬃcacy, because the donor can actually help
some people (from 1 to 4,500). Instead, it is a form of pseudoineﬃ-
cacy that is non-rational. We should not be deterred from helping
one person, or 4,500, just because there are others we cannot help.
In the present article we extend these ﬁndings to situations
involving what we call fast or intuitive pseudoineﬃcacy. We
propose that fast pseudoineﬃcacy is linked to virtually imme-
diate dampening of warm glow by negative feelings, perhaps of
sadness or unhappiness, in situations with small numbers of iden-
tiﬁed people in need and small numbers unable to be helped.
We describe a series of studies designed to examine fast pseu-
doineﬃcacy and clarify the aﬀective processes that contribute to
it.
To test our hypothesis that, evenwhen the numbers of aﬀected
individuals are small, negative aﬀect associated with awareness of
those not helped reduces the warm glow arising from doing good
things, we employ a paradigm involving helping one or more
starving children identiﬁed by name, age, photo, and so on. We
systematically vary the number of children who can be helped and
the number who cannot. A critical feature of our paradigm that
distinguishes it from the typical design in previous proportion
dominance studies, is that we inform participants that the chil-
dren not helped should be irrelevant to the judgments about the
child that could be helped (hence pseudo-ineﬃcacy). However, as
in previous proportion dominance studies, we expect that partic-
ipants would pay attention to the children not helped, leading to
decreased warm glow for the child that could be helped.
The Affective Basis of Pseudoinefficacy
Aﬀective feelings play a central role as a common currency, allow-
ing decision makers to compare or integrate values for multiple,
diverse stimuli (Cabanac, 1992). But sometimes the integration
goes awry in a peculiar form of aﬀective calculus that Polish poet
Zbigniew Herbert has called “the arithmetic of compassion” (see,
e.g., Herbert, 2007, p. 286). For example when only one life is
at stake, the value attached to saving or prolonging that life is
extreme. But as the number of lives at risk increases, phenomena
such as psychophysical numbing and psychic numbing (Slovic,
2007), appear to lead our fast, intuitive, gut reactions on a path
much diﬀerent from one guided by the normal logic of arith-
metic. With numbing, one life plus one life may be valued at
something less than two lives. With compassion fade or collapse,
1+ 1 may be valued as less than 1!
Pseudoineﬃcacy is foreshadowed by a number of studies
of aﬀect integration in other domains. In impression forma-
tion, research shows that adding information that is moderately
positive to information that is highly positive leads to lower
judgments (Anderson, 1981), resulting from averaging values
rather than adding them. An example of this from the consumer
domain is provided by Yadav (1994), who asked consumers to
rate their preference for diﬀerent sets of furniture. Participants in
the individual-item condition read information about a bed that
pretest participants had rated as excellent. Those in the bundle
condition rated a set consisting of two items: the same highly
favorable bed plus a chest that was described as moderately favor-
able. Participants gave higher preference ratings to the bed alone
than those in a separate group gave to a set containing both
the bed and the moderately favorable chest (see also Weaver
et al., 2012). Interestingly, Kralik et al. (2012) found evidence
for similar averaging in non-human primates; rhesus monkeys
preferred a high-value food item alone to the same item paired
with one of positive but lower value. Similarly, Hsee et al. (1999)
asked respondents to state the amount they were willing to pay
to purchase each of two sets of dinnerware. Set S contained 24
pieces, all in good condition. Set J contained all of the same
pieces plus eight more, all in good condition, along with 16 other
pieces that were broken (40 total). In a single (separate) evalu-
ation, respondents were willing to pay more for set S, though it
was the inferior option, apparently devalued by the broken pieces.
But in joint (side-by-side) evaluation, respondents were willing
to pay more for Set J. Thus, in separate evaluation, negative aﬀect
appears to reduce positive aﬀect through averaging.
Similarly, studies of the dilution eﬀect compare the impact of
diagnostic information with that of non-diagnostic information.
The former is knowledge that is useful in making a particular
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judgment, whereas the latter is not relevant to that judgment.
Research has shown that when both kinds of information are
relevant, people tend to under-rely on diagnostic information
(Nisbett et al., 1981; Tetlock et al., 1996). Thus the presence of
non-diagnostic information weakens, or dilutes, the impact of
diagnostic information.
Based on the above research, we hypothesize that the feelings
and responses to children who can be helped may be damp-
ened by being integrated with the lesser or even negative feelings
associated with learning of children who cannot be helped.
Speciﬁcally, the present research set out to examine whether
negative feelings coming from children that cannot be helped
would dampen the positive feelings for the children, perhaps
through some form of aﬀective averaging.
Experiments
Overview
In Study 1, an initial test of pseudoineﬃcacy was conducted
wherein participants rated their feelings and indicated howmuch
money they would donate to either one child (who would be
helped for certain) or one of two children (one child cannot be
helped, but uncertain which child). In Study 2, we employed two
experimental conditions where one child is helped and ﬁve other
children cannot be helped. In the uncertain condition partici-
pants were not told which child of the six would be helped. In
the certain condition participants were explicitly made aware of
which of the children they could and could not help. Study 3
introduced ratings of warm glow. It included more variations of
the number of children helped or not helped (always specifying
which children could be helped, and which could not be helped).
Studies 4a,b employed within-subjects designs where participants
rated warm glow as a function of the number of children helped.
Finally, Studies 5a,b tested whether including irrelevant neutral
visual distractors or aﬀect-inducing non-children pictures would
produce dampening of warm glow for helping a child.
Ethics Statement
Experiments were conducted in accordance with the ethical stan-
dards laid down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki. Studies
were approved by the local ethics committes where the data
was collected (Västra Götalands regional ethics board, Studies
1, 2, 5a,b), and IRB University of Oregon, Study 3, and 4a,b).
Participants were compensated for their participation and gave
their informed consent prior to inclusion in the studies. In all
studies, participants received information about the study prior
to participating. After completing their task, participants were
thoroughly debriefed.
Study 1: Initial Demonstration of
Pseudoinefficacy
This initial study was designed to extend the large-number
paradigms used in previous studies (Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997;
Small et al., 2007) by introducing a paradigm where participants
are asked to donate to a either single child or one out of two
children.
Method and Design
Ninety-four undergraduates (48 males) at Göteborg University,
Sweden with a mean age of 27.3 (SD 5.1) participated in this
study. A procedure devised by Small et al. (2007) was used
in which participants, after completing an unrelated survey,
received seven Swedish 10-kronor coins, a blank envelope, a ques-
tionnaire including the three response measures, and a charity
request letter. The experimenter instructed participants to ﬁrst
read the charity request letter carefully, then place their donations
(if any) in the envelope. Next, participants were asked to complete
the questionnaire and return both the letter and questionnaire in
the sealed envelope.
The letter informed the participant of the opportunity to
donate any of their just-earned 70 kronors to the organization
Save the Children. Participants were randomly allocated to one
of the single or uncertain conditions. First, there were two single-
child conditions: a description and picture of either a 7-year-old
girl, Rokia (n = 21) or a 9-year-old boy, Moussa (n = 22).
Participants were instructed that
Any money that you donate will go to Rokia [Moussa]. Rokia
[Moussa] is desperately poor, and faces a threat of severe hunger
or even starvation. Her [His] life will be changed for the better as
a result of your ﬁnancial gift. With your support, and the support
of other caring sponsors, Save the Children will work with Rokia’s
[Moussa’s] family and other members of the community to help
feed her [him], provide her [him] with education, as well as basic
medical care and hygiene education.
In the “uncertain” condition (n = 51), participants
received a similar description but with pictures and stories
of both Rokia and Moussa. Participants were instructed
that their donations would go to Rokia or Moussa.
Three response measures were used:
(1) Willingness to donate. Participants could circle any number
between 0 and 70 Swedish Crowns (SEK) in 10-crown incre-
ments.
(2) Aﬀect. Participants rated “how do you feel about donating to
Rokia/Moussa/the child?” on a scale ranging from Negative
(−1) to Positive (+5).
(3) Perceived probability that the donation would make a real
diﬀerence (1–5 scale anchored by Not at all likely to Very
likely).
Results and Discussion
Table 1 shows means comparing the uncertain condition to the
average of the two single conditions. Independent t-tests showed
that donations were signiﬁcantly higher in the single conditions,
t(92) = 2.12, p < 0.05. Aﬀect ratings were also more positive in
the single conditions, [t(92) = 2.46, p < 0.05]. The perceived
probability of making a diﬀerence did not systematically diﬀer
between conditions, t(92) = 1.76, p = 0.08, but as can be seen in
Table 1, there was a trend for higher probability in the single child
condition.
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TABLE 1 | Willingness to donate, affect, and probability for uncertain and
single conditions.
Uncertain
One of two
Single child children
(n = 43) (n = 51)
Donations (SEK) 26.5 (11.7) 20.2 (13.1)
Affect 3.7 (1.2) 3.1 (1.2)
Probability 2.4 (0.7) 2.1 (0.8)
SD in parenthesis.
Although donors may consider their contributions to be a
drop in the bucket in some circumstances, such thinking is
unlikely to underlie the results of this study, given that half of
the two children at risk could be helped. Because the instructions
in the uncertain condition explicitly stated that one of the two
children would be helped, we believe that participants considered
the one child not helped in the uncertain conditions and that this
reduced aﬀect and donations.
Study 2: Comparing Uncertain and Certain
Conditions Where Children are Explicitly Not
Being Helped
It is possible that results from Study 1 were aﬀected by the uncer-
tainty regarding which child would be helped (Gneezy et al.,
2006). Previous research has found that uncertainty elicits nega-
tive aﬀect (Kurtz et al., 2007). In Study 2, we controlled for this
possibility by directly contrasting an uncertain condition (one of
n will be helped, but uncertain which one), and a certain condi-
tion (this child will be helped for sure; these others will not be
helped).
Method and Design
One hundred and four undergraduates at Göteborg University,
Sweden (65 females) with a mean age of 24.1 participated in
Study 2.
We collected ratings of warm glow and aﬀect in a between-
groups design where participants either saw one child who could
be helped (n= 37) or one of two scenarios where one child could
be helped and six could not be helped. In the uncertain condition
(n = 33) participants were not told which one of the seven chil-
dren could be helped. In the certain condition (n= 34), the child
who could be helped was identiﬁed.
In the single-child condition, an identiﬁed child with a photo
and a name was presented. Participants were instructed that:
This is a picture of Nayani. Her living conditions are very bad
and she needs your help. Without your help Nayani will likely
not survive. You can help Nayani by donating money. Below are
a number of questions about your thoughts and feelings about
helping Nayani.
The certain condition included seven pictures, each depicting
a named child. Participants were instructed that:
This is picture of some children. Their living conditions are very
bad and they need your help. Without your help these children
will likely not survive. You can help one of these children by
donating money. The child you can help is located to the left. Her
name is Nayani.
The presentation included identifying information about
Nayani and a color photo, while photos of the six other children
were faded and printed in black and white.
In the uncertain condition participants saw pictures of all
seven children (all were named and presented in color) and were
instructed that:
This is picture of some children. Their living conditions are very
bad and they need your help. Without your help these children
will likely not survive. You can help one of these children by
donating money. Below are a number of questions about your
thoughts and feelings about helping one of the children.
Participants in all conditions rated their feelings using three
scales anchored by 0 (Not at all) to 7 (Very much):
(1) Warm glow: “If I donated money, I would experience a warm
glow feeling.”
(2) Positive aﬀect: “I have positive feelings when I think about
Nayani/the child.”
(3) Compassion: “I have compassionate feelings for Nayani/the
child.”
Participants were then debriefed and thanked for their
participation.
Results and Discussion
Analysis of variances (ANOVAs) on the dependent measures
yielded signiﬁcant eﬀects on all scales. Warm-glow, positive
aﬀect, and compassion ratings were signiﬁcantly lower in the
certain condition than in the single-child condition. The uncer-
tain condition was not diﬀerent from the certain condition on any
of the three scales (see Table 2).
Together, these ﬁndings show that information about children
not helped dampens aﬀect for the child who could be helped.
However, aﬀect in the certain condition was not signiﬁcantly
lower than in the uncertain condition. These ﬁndings suggest that
the negative feelings associated with awareness of the children not
being helped dampen feelings for the child that could be helped.
It should, however, be noted that the particular stimuli used here
with the children not helped faded out may have dampened the
emotional response to these children. In Study 3, a new paradigm
was used where the children not helped were shown in a simi-
lar way to the child that could be helped. In addition, we further
TABLE 2 | Mean ratings and SD for warm glow, positive affect, and
compassion for the three conditions in Study 2.
One child Uncertain Certain F p
Warm glow 3.3a (1.0) 2.9a,b (1.1) 2.5b (1.1) 4.46 <0.02
Positive affect 2.7a (1.3) 2.2a,b (0.8) 2.0b (1.0) 3.28 <0.05
Compassion 4.1a (1.1) 3.4b (1.0) 3.2b (1.4) 4.95 <0.01
SD in parenthesis. Subscripts not shared are significantly different at p < 0.05.
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extended the “certain” paradigm from Study 2 to test how vari-
ations in the number of children helped or not helped inﬂuence
warm glow.
Study 3: Varying Numbers of Children
Helped or Not Helped
Method and Design
Five hundred forty-three U. S. participants from a nation-wide
sample (mean age 38, 56% female) completed an online version
of the experiment. Study 3 directly examined the eﬀect on warm
glow of the number of children helped or not helped. Participants
again saw pictures of children. In the ﬁrst scenario seen by a
participant we varied the number helped or not helped in a
between-subjects design: 1/0 (helped/not helped), 1/1, 1/6, 2/0,
and 2/1 (see Figure 1 for an example of one condition). However,
after seeing the initial scenario, participants in each condition saw
all other scenarios in mixed orders, thus allowing us to also do an
analysis of ratings within-subjects. The instructions read:
In this survey you will be presented with children in need of help.
We will ask you to think about “warm glow,” a positive feeling
that you may experience when you do something good for some-
one. Take a moment to think about one situation from your own
life when you experienced this feeling. Next we will ask you to
consider the warm glow you would expect to feel if you donated
to help children in need.
Participants were then shown one of the conditions with a
picture and names of the child(ren). For example, in the 1/6
condition they were instructed that:
These are seven children in need of aid. The child on the left,
Ofelo, is facing starvation and is in immediate need of food. The
six children on the right are facing ill health from water-borne
diseases and are in immediate need of clean water and medicines.
Suppose that you are now given the opportunity to donate money
to a trusted aid organization to help Ofelo (the child on the left).
Unfortunately, you can only help Ofelo and not the other children,
for whom aid may not be available.
The warm-glow scale was an open-ended response anchored
by 0 (No warm glow) to 100 (Very strong warm glow).
Results and Discussion
Means for both within- and between-subject comparisons are
shown in Table 3. The overall between-subjects ANOVA was
signiﬁcant: F(1,540) = 2.39, p < 0.05. As can be seen in Table 3,
for both between and within- subjects designs, warm glow asso-
ciated with helping one child decreased linearly as the number
of children not helped increased from zero not helped, to one
not helped, and then to six not helped. Two children helped
elicited warm glow similar to one child helped. A within-
subject ANOVA (collapsing across diﬀerent orders) also showed
a signiﬁcant condition eﬀect, F(1,540) = 35.57, p < 0.0001.
Comparing two helped and two helped/one not helped in the
between–subjects design, a non-signiﬁcant increase in warm
glow occurred. However, within subjects, two helped/one not
helped exhibited a statistically signiﬁcant decrease in warm glow
compared to two helped.
Study 3 thus replicated the basic pseudoineﬃcacy eﬀect and,
further, showed that warm-glow ratings were sensitive to the
number of children not helped. With the increasing number not
helped, warm-glow feelings were further dampened. The eﬀects
were very similar for both within- and between-subjects compar-
isons. These results suggest that participants pay attention to
magnitude and proportions even though changes in the number
of children that could not be helped should be irrelevant to the
feelings for the child that could be helped. This ﬁnding is thus
FIGURE 1 | Example of stimulus materials for one condition.
TABLE 3 | Mean and SD for warm-glow ratings for both between- and within-subject comparisons (Study 3).
Helped/could not be helped
1/0 1/1 1/6 2/0 2/1
(n = 137) (n = 100) (n = 110) (n = 86) (n = 80)
Between-subjects 54.9a (32.6) 50.8b (31.3) 47.1c (33.1) 55.8a (31.0) 60.4a (30.9)
Within-subjects (n = 502) 53.6a (32.8) 49.6b (31.8) 45.4c (33.5) 53.7a (32.2) 51.4b (32.1)
SD in parenthesis. Mean not sharing a subscript are different at p < 0.05. Table entries are warm-glow ratings on a 0–100 scale.
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largely consistent with what has been found in the literature on
proportion dominance (Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997). However,
it is important to emphasize that while the reference group (the
larger need) is relevant for the judgment in proportion domi-
nance studies (saving 4,500 out of 11,000 feels better than saving
4,500 out of 250,000), our paradigm make explicit that the chil-
dren not helped are “out of reach” and cannot be helped and thus
should be irrelevant to the feelings for saving the child that can be
saved.
Studies 4a,b: Testing Robustness of the
Effect in Within-Subjects Designs
Previous research (Hsee and Zhang, 2010; Kogut and Ritov,
2005a) has documented that in “joint evaluation” participants
typically adjust their responses (so that they are the same) when
they realize that their judgment is about the same object or
stimulus (in this case the warm glow for a single child). The
within-subjects results in Study 3, however, suggest that the pseu-
doineﬃcacy eﬀect may resist this type of judgmental correction.
In Study 4, we further tested this resistance by assessing warm
glow in a within-subjects designwith a ﬁxed order of presentation
of several diﬀerent donation opportunities.
Study 4a was conducted as a classroom exercise and Study 4b
was a replication using an individualized computer survey in a
laboratory setting.
Method and Design
Study 4a
One hundred and forty-three students in a college classroom at
the University of Oregon participated in this study. About two
thirds were women. Their mean age was about 20. The number
of children who could be helped was systematically varied in the
following ﬁxed order: six helped/one not helped, two helped/one
not helped, one helped/one not helped, one helped. The general
instructions were as follows:
Here are some questions about children in Africa who live in
poverty. I will ask you to consider helping these children by donat-
ing money to a respected aid organization and then answer a
number of questions about your thoughts and feelings.
In particular I would like you to think about warm glow—a posi-
tive feeling that you may experience when you do something
good for someone. Have you experienced this? Take a moment
and think about one situation from your own life when you
experienced this feeling.
Next I will ask you to consider the warm glow you expect to feel if
you donated to help children in need.
The ﬁrst rating was for warm glow expected if one donated
money to help six children (pictured, with names) but could not
donate to a seventh, pictured and named child, as follows:
These are seven children in need of aid. Suppose that you are given
the opportunity to donate money to a trusted aid organization to
help the six children to the left (Nelson, Sueva, Moussa, Mutaka,
Jallo, Maluf). Unfortunately you can only help these six children
and not Okeke, for whom aid may not be available. Rate the warm
glow you expect to feel if you donated money to help these six
children (Nelson, Sueva, Moussa, Mutaka, Jallo, and Maluf).
Participants rated their warm glow by pressing a button on
an audience-voting system (participants were instructed that the
response options represented the following intervals on a 0–100
scale of warm glow: 1= 0–20, 2 = 21–40, 3 = 41–60, 4= 61–80,
FIGURE 2 | Mean warm-glow ratings in within-subjects designs (Studies 4a,b).
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5= 81–100). Our data-collection method did not track individual
answers, so only means are reported for this study.
Study 4b
Forty-eight University of Oregon undergraduates (mean age
20.5 years; 75% female) participated in a lab study. Themethodol-
ogy was similar to Study 4a, except participants rated the pictures
in a computer survey. They responded using the same ﬁve-
category scale of warm-glow used in Study 4a. Responses were
tracked within-subjects, allowing statistical tests to be performed.
Results and Discussion
In both Studies 4a,b, warm glow decreased as the number
of children who could be helped decreased (see Figure 2).
A within-subjects ANOVA showed a signiﬁcant condition eﬀect
F(1,46) = 11.80, p < 0.01 for Study 4b. Importantly, the crit-
ical diﬀerence between one child helped/one not helped and
one helped showed that the mean warm glow was substantially
higher in the one-child condition. In Study 4b, this diﬀerence was
signiﬁcant in a Bonferroni post hoc test (p< 0.01).
Together, Studies 4a,b extended our earlier results in two ways:
In contrast to the earlier studies, we kept the number of chil-
dren not helped constant (one), and varied the number helped.
We found that participants experienced less warm glow as the
number of children helped decreased, a ﬁnding that is again
consistent with proportion dominance (Fetherstonhaugh et al.,
1997). However, the single child helped received the highest
warm-glow rating consistent with the singularity eﬀect (Kogut
and Ritov, 2005a). Importantly, when the single child was paired
with one other child not helped, that child then received the
lowest warm-glow rating. It is notable that this eﬀect occurred
even with a ﬁxed order where the single child appeared last and,
arguably, participants would likely recognize that in both the one
helped/one not helped and the one-helped scenarios they may
help only one child and thus need not change their warm-glow
ratings. We believe this is a demonstration of the robustness and
pervasiveness of dampening of good feelings for the child one can
help when paired with one or more children one cannot help. It
should, however, be noted that the social setting that Study 4a was
conducted in could have elicited other motives, such as reputa-
tion, that would have inﬂuenced warm glow feelings (Andreoni,
1990). However, given the similarity between Study 4a, conducted
in a class room setting, and 4b, conducted as a more standard lab
experiment, social esteem seemed not to drive the eﬀect.
Studies 5a,b: Testing an Alternative
Explanation and a Possible Mechanism
Studies 5a,b had three goals; (1) provide evidence that the
children not helped induce negative aﬀect that dampens the
positive aﬀect for the child helped, (2) examine whether pseu-
doineﬃcacy could be produced by simply introducing other
non-children stimuli, and (3) examine whether the role of nega-
tive aﬀect could be isolated by incidentally manipulating negative
aﬀect.
In Study 5a we contrasted the eﬀect on ratings of warm glow
of children who cannot be helped with the eﬀect of visual stim-
uli. If the dampening of warm glow observed in the previous
studies was due to mere presence of additional visual objects
while attending to the child that could be helped, we would also
expect to ﬁnd reduced warm-glow ratings in conditions with
visual stimuli other than children.
In Study 5b we tested the hypothesis that a responsible mech-
anism for pseudoineﬃcacy is negative aﬀect associated with the
children not helped. We also compared the eﬀect of children
who cannot be helped with the eﬀect of other visual stimuli that
induce negative aﬀect. We expected that other sorts of irrelevant
pictures that induce negative aﬀect would also reduce warm glow,
consistent with our main explanation for the eﬀect.
Study 5a: Non-Affective, Non-Child Stimuli
Method and design
One hundred and forty-eight undergraduates at Göteborg
University, Sweden (mean age 32, 68% female) participated in an
online survey. To test the eﬀect on warm glow of visual distrac-
tors, we compared a condition (n = 54) where one child could
be helped and six could not be helped with a condition (n = 44)
where six shapes were substituted for the six children not helped
(see Figure 3). In addition, a single-child condition was included
(n = 44).
In each of the three conditions, participants were given the
same general instructions to think about warm glow as were given
in our prior studies and they were asked to rate the warm glow
they expected to feel for the single child they could help, using a
0 (No warm glow) to 100 (Very strong warm glow) response scale.
Participants in the one/six children condition also rated how
they felt when they viewed the children not helped (on a −2 to
2 scale from very bad to very good). Participants in the shapes
condition similarly rated how bad or good they felt when they
viewed the shapes on a four-point scale ranging from Very bad
(−2) to Very good (+2).
FIGURE 3 | Child and shapes used in the visual distraction experiment in Study 5a.
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Results and discussion
An ANOVA showed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of condition
F(2,141) = 2.99, p = 0.05. As can be seen in Figure 4, mean
warm glow was signiﬁcantly lower in the one-child-helped/six-
children-not-helped condition than in the single-child condition
[planned contrast t(96) = 2.31, p < 0.03], replicating our previ-
ous ﬁndings. The one child/six shapes condition did not diﬀer
from the single-child condition [planned contrast t(96) = 0.91,
p = 0.92], suggesting that visual distraction is not the cause of
the observed pseudoineﬃcacy. Consistent with a negative-aﬀect
explanation, participants experienced signiﬁcantly more negative
aﬀect (M = −0.28) when viewing the children not helped than
when viewing the shapes (M = 0.31); [t(86)= 3.81, p=< 0.001].
Further, the correlation across participants between warm-glow
ratings and the valence ratings of the children not helped was
positive and signiﬁcant, r = 0.32, p < 0.05, while the correla-
tion between warm glow and valence ratings of the shapes was
r = 0.00, p> 0.05.
Study 5b: Affective Non-Child Stimuli
In Study 5b we sought to determine the role of negative aﬀect in
dampening warm glow. The design was similar to Study 5a but,
instead of aﬀect-neutral shapes, pictures selected to induce strong
negative aﬀect were shown.
Method and design
One hundred-four undergraduates at Göteborg University,
Sweden with a mean age of 23 years (61% female) participated
in a web-based survey. To test the eﬀect of negative aﬀect, we
compared a condition (n = 26) where one child could be helped
and six could not with a condition (n = 43) in which six nega-
tive aﬀect-inducing pictures were substituted for the six children
not helped (see Figure 5). The pictures were selected from the
International Aﬀective Pictures System (IAPS; Bradley and Lang,
2000). As in Study 5a, a single-child condition was included
FIGURE 4 | Mean warm-glow ratings across the different conditions in
the distractor study.
(n = 35). In addition to rating warm glow for the child, partic-
ipants in the one-plus-six children condition rated how bad or
good they felt when viewing the children not helped (−2 to +2
scale). Participants in the picture condition also rated how bad or
good they felt when they viewed the set of pictures (−2 to +2).
Results and discussion
Participants rated both the aﬀect experienced while viewing the
pictures (M = −0.53) and the children (M = −0.54) as nega-
tive. An ANOVA showed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of condition
on warm glow ratings, F(2,101) = 3.01, p = 0.05. As can be
seen in Figure 6, mean warm glow was signiﬁcantly lower in the
one-child-helped/six-children-not-helped condition than in the
single-child condition [planned contrast t(59) = 2.07, p < 0.05],
replicating the basic pseudoineﬃcacy eﬀect. Similarly, and critical
to our hypothesis, warm glow in the one child/six pictures condi-
tion was also signiﬁcantly lower than in the single-child condition
[planned contrast t(76) = 2.27, p < 0.03], suggesting that irrele-
vant negative aﬀect intruded upon and decreased the aﬀect from
helping the child.
Additionally, the correlation between warm-glow ratings and
the valence ratings of the children not helped was positive and
signiﬁcant, r = 0.48, p< 0.05. Consistent with the aﬀect explana-
tion, the correlation between warm-glow and valence ratings of
the pictures was similar in magnitude, r = 0.35, p < 0.05. Thus,
both sources of negative aﬀect, pictures of children not helped
and diverse negative pictures, intruded upon and diminished
anticipated warm glow from helping the child in need.
General Discussion
The studies described here show that donors pay attention not
only to relevant information (children who can be helped), but
also incorporate feelings from normatively irrelevant information
(e.g., children who cannot be helped) when that information is
brought to their attention. Irrelevant negative feelings associated
with those not able to be helped appeared to blend with the good
feelings for those who can be helped, leading to dampened warm
glow. This eﬀect is not a form of ineﬃcacy attributable to “drop-
in-the-bucket” (Bartels and Burnett, 2011) cognitions because it
occurs even when a substantial proportion of children, though
not all, can be helped (e.g., see Table 1; Figure 2). The fact that
one cannot help other children should not inﬂuence the decision
to help a child who can be helped.
We demonstrated that fast pseudoineﬃcacy is an aﬀective
phenomenon—positive feelings about the child one can help
are dampened by negative feelings associated with children who
cannot be helped. In Studies 1–4, we found that aﬀect ratings
and feelings of warm glow (associated with the child one can
help) were lower when children who could not be helped were
made salient. In Study 5a,b, we demonstrated that the children
not helped induced negative aﬀect that reduced the positive warm
glow for the child that could be helped. We also found that
the pseudoineﬃcacy eﬀect is not merely due to the presence of
other stimuli. Warm-glow ratings of a single child who could
be helped were not reduced when that child was accompanied
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FIGURE 5 | Example of stimuli used in Study 5b.
by non-aﬀective, non-children stimuli. In further support of an
aﬀect-based explanation, Study 5b showed that when other, unre-
lated, pictures that induced negative emotion accompanied the
single child, warm-glow ratings were as low as in the pseu-
doineﬃcacy conditions where children not being helped were
present.
FIGURE 6 | Mean warm-glow ratings in the picture study (Study 5b).
While this research primarily documented that good feelings
associated with helping decreased in presence of negative aﬀect
from children not helped, we believe that actual helping behavior
is strongly motivated by these feelings. For instance, research has
shown that both self-reported positive aﬀect/warm glow as well
as physiological indicators (facial muscle activity and activation
of the reward circuitry in the brain) predicts if, and how much,
people are willing to help (Genevsky et al., 2013; Västfjäll et al.,
2014). Moreover, our Study 1 showed that hypothetical donations
were lower (along with feelings of sympathy and compassion) in
the pseudoineﬃcacy conditions.
The primary dependent variable in these studies has been
positive aﬀect/warm glow. We acknowledge that negative aﬀect
also may be a motivator of behavior (Manucia et al., 1984). For
instance, guilt reduction predicts that individuals seek to repair
their aﬀective state by engaging in aﬀect-enhancing activities such
as giving (Cialdini et al., 1982; Clark and Isen, 1982). Further, the
link between warm glow and giving in pseudoineﬃcacy contexts
is not entirely clear from the present research. While previous
research has suggested a close connection between anticipated
warm glow of giving and the decision to donate (Andreoni, 1990),
it is possible that both the decision to donate and the amount
to donate may not show a 1-to-1 correspondence with warm
glow (Dunn et al., 2008). Our results from Study 1 suggest a
strong correlation between donations and positive feelings. But,
since we only measured willingness to donate and positive aﬀect
simultaneously in our ﬁrst study and then focused on the feeling
component (positive aﬀect/warm glow) in subsequent studies, an
important task for future research is to examine this relationship
more closely in the context of pseudoineﬃcacy.
Pseudoineﬃcacy has implications for theories of decision-
making. With the common psychophysical form of numbing, the
value attached to saving lives increases monotonically, but at a
decreasing rate, as represented by the value function for gains in
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). With pseudoin-
eﬃcacy, this monotonic increase can cease abruptly when one or
more lives appear that are beyond help. For instance, in Study 4,
warm glow increased monotonically with one, two, and then six
children helped in the context of one that could not be helped.
But the anticipated warm glow from helping a single child was
far greater than the glow of helping one, two, or even six chil-
dren in the presence of one out of reach, illustrating a version
of what Markowitz et al. (2013) and Västfjäll et al. (2014) have
termed compassion fade. Note also, in Figure 2, that the strong
singularity eﬀect exhibited for the child alone is greatly dimin-
ished when that child is accompanied by one child who cannot
be helped. Perhaps this is a reverse singularity eﬀect whereby the
one out of reach creates a strong negative feeling that subtracts
greatly from the warm glow. Future research should address this
more closely.
Another important ﬁnding was the robustness of the pseu-
doineﬃcay eﬀect. Earlier research in the domain of life-saving
has shown that joint evaluation of options has been shown to
reverse psychophysical numbing (Fetherstonhaugh et al., 1997).
However, in Studies 4a,b, we found that pseudoineﬃcacy eﬀects
remained even in within-subject designs where people evaluated
options in a joint evaluation mode. This ﬁnding is in contrast to
most proportion dominance studies that ﬁnd reliance on propor-
tion in separate, but not joint, evaluation (but see Bartels, 2006).
A striking example from Studies 4a,b is that warm-glow ratings
for helping a single child were higher than in all conditions in
which one child could not be helped, even though the single
child to be helped was presented last. It can be argued that
participants in our within-subjects studies should not be inﬂu-
enced by the children not being helped since the manipulation
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should be very transparent and salient. The fact that pseudoin-
eﬃcacy remains in joint evaluation suggests that it is a robust
phenomenon.
In summary, we use the term pseudoineﬃcacy to describe
the attenuation of warm glow feelings for the child that can
be helped, by presence or awareness of children that cannot
be helped (and thus should be normatively unrelated to the
judgment). These ﬁndings, together with previous research on
proportional reasoning, suggest that there is a very close relation-
ship between proportion of people helped and perceived eﬃcacy.
Further, proportion conveys aﬀect, typically more strongly than
does the absolute number helped (Slovic et al., 2002).
But why is proportion so important and so aﬀective relative to
absolute number, which should be the logical/rational driver of
eﬀectiveness? One could argue that it is because proportion cues
perceived eﬃcacy very strongly bymaking the absolute number of
people helped, as well as the reference group easily accessible to
people. Without the reference group, the aﬀective meaning of the
absolute number of people saved is less clear (Slovic et al., 2002).
For example, Fetherstonhaugh et al. (1997) found that people’s
willingness to intervene to save a stated number of lives was deter-
mined more by the proportion of lives saved than by the actual
number of lives that would be saved. However, when two or more
interventions were directly compared, number of lives saved
became more important than proportion saved. Thus, number of
lives saved, standing alone, appears to be poorly evaluable. With
a side-by-side (joint evaluation) comparison, the number of lives
became clear.
Slovic et al. (2002), drawing upon proportion dominance and
the limited evaluability of numbers of lives, predicted (and found)
that people, in a between-groups design, would more strongly
support an airport-safety measure expected to save 98% of 150
lives at risk than a measure expected to save 150 lives. Saving
150 lives is diﬀusely good, hence only weakly evaluable, whereas
saving 98% of something is clearly very good because it is so
close to the upper bound on the percentage scale, and hence is
readily evaluable and highly weighted in the support judgment.
Subsequent reduction of the percentage of 150 lives that would
be saved to 95, 90, and 85% led to reduced support for the safety
measure but each of these percentage conditions still garnered a
higher mean level of support than did the save 150 lives condition.
While the pseudoineﬃcacy eﬀects documented here show a
sensitivity to the number of children not helped, much like
proportional reasoning, the fact that we informed participants
that the children not helped could not be helped make our
paradigm conceptually diﬀerent from proportion dominance
studies, where the reference group typically is normatively rele-
vant to the judgment (Bartels, 2006). However, our results suggest
that decision makers indeed pay attention to, and use available
information about the reference group as if it were relevant for
their judgment even in this context. Thus, proportion appears to
be a primary driver of warm glow feelings and helping. But, inter-
estingly, we also found dampening of warm glow even when a
proportional judgment of numbers made no sense – pairing the
child that could be helped with clearly irrelevant pictures (e.g., a
shark) that induced negative aﬀect, reduced warm glow. Pairing
the child that could be helped with non-aﬀective, non-children
pictures did not decrease warm glow. Thus, it appears as if partic-
ipants engaged in a form of aﬀective proportional reasoning
(good–bad judgments). Integration of irrelevant aﬀective infor-
mation in judgments likely occurs often since the aﬀective system
is poorly designed to judge true from false (Västfjäll and Slovic,
2013).
It should be noted that our pseudoineﬃcacy studies used small
numbers (one to six) of identiﬁed victims who could not be
helped. Future research should examine whether negative aﬀect
associated with large numbers of statistical victims who are out
of reach (i.e., smaller proportion) demotivate individuals from
helping in a similar way.
Overcoming Pseudoinefficacy
Given that pseudoineﬃcacy appears to be a robust phenomenon
with important implications, it is important to consider how it
can be attenuated, eliminated, or reversed. It is typically the case
that even our best eﬀorts cannot help everyone in need. Thus
it would be unfortunate, indeed, if we let this “incompleteness”
deter us from accomplishing what is within our grasp.
But countering, or at least minimizing, pseudoineﬃcacy might
not be easy. Kahneman (2011) summarizes a vast amount of
research demonstrating that the human mind processes informa-
tion in two ways: fast and slow (see also Kahneman and Frederick,
2002; Kahneman, 2003). Fast thinking, akin to what Haidt (2001)
calls moral intuition when it comes to saving lives, is like percep-
tion. Moral feelings arise quickly and seem veridical, without
reﬂection (Haidt, 2001), much like visual perceptions. But just as
the human eye, as accurate as it is, can be deceived by certain
patterns creating “visual illusions,” certain forms of contextual
information, such as children who cannot be helped, may create
“moral illusions.” And just as visual illusions may persist even
when we know them to be false, the illusion of pseudoineﬃ-
cacy may be similarly hard to dispel. In light of our ﬁndings, we
can delete or minimize reference to the larger need the dona-
tion request addresses. One charity put the statistic, “3 million
in need” above the picture of a starving child, likely demotivating
many donors.
Since pseudoineﬃcacy appears to be an aﬀective phenom-
ena, perhaps a more promising strategy is the one used by
Schwarz and Clore (1983) to block the intrusion of irrelevant
feelings. Schwarz and Clore (1983) found that merely reminding
respondents about the true source of their feelings (the weather)
eliminated the aﬀect-congruent inﬂuence on judgments (global
well-being). Following, Schwarz et al. (2007), perhaps reminding
participants that the source of the bad feelings they experience
really is the children they cannot help, and not the child they can
help, would eliminate pseudoineﬃcacy.
The strategy used by Schwarz and Clore (1983) works to alter
the immediate feelings associated with fast thinking. Perhaps
pseudoineﬃcacy can be overcome by teaching individuals to
be compassionate and helpful through moral arguments (Haidt,
2001) or examples demonstrating illusions of non-eﬃcacy in
rather stark ways. For example, might a variation of Singer’s
(2009) famous “child in the pond” example drive home the irra-
tionality of pseudoineﬃcacy? Singer (2009) asks us to imagine
ourselves walking past a shallow pond and seeing a small child
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playing in it suddenly slip under the water and begin to drown.
“Would you, without hesitation, rush into the water to rescue the
child?” he asks, “Of course you would,” he answers, and we nod in
agreement. Consider the following addition to the story as a debi-
asing manipulation: “Now suppose, as you see the child go under,
you also see, further away, another child begin to drown—one
you cannot reach. Would you then be less motivated to rescue
the child within your reach?” “Should you be?”
Perhaps a lesson in eﬃcacy might also combat pseudoineﬃ-
cacy. Consider the famous starﬁsh story attributed to American
author Eiseley (1969):
While wandering a deserted beach at dawn, stagnant in my work,
I saw a man in the distance bending and throwing as he walked
the endless stretch toward me. As he came near, I could see that
he was throwing starﬁsh, abandoned on the sand by the tide, back
into the sea. When he was close enough I asked him why he was
working so hard at this strange task. He said that the sun would
dry the starﬁsh and they would die. I said to him that I thought
he was foolish. There were 1000s of starﬁsh on miles and miles of
beach. One man alone could never make a diﬀerence. He smiled
as he picked up the next starﬁsh. Hurling it far into the sea he said,
“It makes a diﬀerence for this one.” I abandoned my writing and
spent the morning throwing starﬁsh.
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